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Summarv 
Within the context of the ongoing debate on the origins and consequences of 
organisational culture, this paper attempts to marry a cultural model of institutional 
structures (Grid/Group Analysis) with the concerns of military organisations. 
The model proposes sharp distinctions in the behaviours, perceptions and values of 
differing military units, based on their respective differing antecendents. 
1 Introduction 
.- 
*- 
,- 
My aim in this paper is, firstly, to discuss the place of a cultural model of 
institutionally driven cognitions in the field of organisational behaviour, with 
particular reference to the issue of organisational culture. 
Secondly, to consider the compatability of such a cultural model to explaining 
individual and group differences of military units in the armed forces. This will be 
done by examining the case of the Israeli Defence Forces. 
1.1 What is Owanisational Culture and How is it Created? 
The notion of organisational culture has become such a frequently used idiom over 
the past decade, that it probably merits its classification as a clichi. Although 
seemingly everyone knows what organisational culture is all about, this could be an 
allusive and far from comprehensive metaphor, as Schein has shown in his seminal 
work on the subject’. 
A key question would be w ether culture is something an organisation has, or is it 
something an organisation is F . The distinction is critical, since it proposes a direction 
of origin, impact and change. 
If culture is something an organisation has, then it would be the case, as Schneider3 
puts it, that ‘the people make the place’. Schneider proposes a natural self 
preservation process that takes place in organisations, whereby people become and 
stay members of an organisation by an attraction, selection and attribution cycle. In 
other words, an organisation and its culture are the sum total of its members and 
nothing else. Culture, then, is the result - not the reason for behaviour. 
On the other hand, if culture is something an organisation is, then culture may well 
be the cause, not the effect. Like the whole that is larger than the total sum of its 
constituents, culture is seen as an independent variable. To take an extreme case, 
even with its members vanished, an organisation still possesses a culture, like a 
pharaohnite pyramid that transmits the values and shared beliefs of its society and 
people, many thousands of years after they perished under the sun. 
1 Schein, G H Organisational Culture and Leadership Jossey-Bass Publishers San 
Francisco 1985 
2 Meek, V L Organisational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses Organisation Studies 
9/4 453-473 1988 
3 Schneider, B The People Make the Place Personnel Psvcholonv 40, 437-453 
1987 
This latter view of culture is the common approach borrowed from anthropology and 
it is within this context and from this perspective that Grid/Group Analysis has been 
developed. 
A second key question is how organisational culture is created. One way to examine 
the creation of ‘culture’ is by following the recruitment, the entry and socialisation 
processes of newcomers into an organisation. Surely there are few as dramatic 
examples of this as is the case of the armed forces. 
I remember vividly arriving, an 18 year old high-school graduate, to the gates of the 
Absorption and Selection Base of the Israeli Defence Forces. “Bassar Tar? (fresh 
meat) the 3-day old “veterans” welcomed with cries of glee the new arrivals, myself 
included. At the end of that day I transformed from a civilian, a citizen of the State 
of Israel who arrived wearing casual clothes and a modern haircut; into a seven- 
numbered serialised conscript, regulated under Marshall Law, fully uniformed, with 
standardised haircut. The following morning I learned to my amazement that from 
now on I have to start shaving daily or ‘sign up’ for a beard. Within days I forgot 
my addiction to coffee (only tea was supplied to trainees), I started smoking and 
swearing. The following week I stood amongst my new mates at the camp’s gates 
welcoming with glee and shouts of “fresh meat” the new arrivals... 
Perhaps even more amazing than this transformation of an 18 year old from civilian 
to soldier, is the twice and trite annual transformation of Israeli civilians in their 
2O’s-3O’s-40’s and 50’s into military reservists. I can testify, as would most of my 
Israeli peers, that this miraculous transformation takes hardly any longer as the years 
pass by. 
With its marked distinctions, a separate legal codex, specified uniforms, regulated 
customs, a developed jargon and institutionalised rituals; it seems that in the armed 
forces the ‘place makes the people’ rather than the other way around. 
Indeed, this is a suitable test case for a cultural model of individual and group 
behaviour that considers behaviour to be conditioned by environmental impacts. 
2 Grid/Grour, Analvsiq 
Grid/Group Analysis (thereafter: G/G) is a typological paradigm for comparing 
cultures and the forms of social organisatio 
6 
that support them, introduced by British 
anthropologist Mary Douglas, a decade ago . 
Based on ethnographies derived from non-industrial societies, the model has by now 
been applied to a variety of institutions, themes and areas, as far apgrt as Chinese 
medieval history, theatre, g 
crime’ and industrial safety s 
ology and mathematical science$, ecology , occupational 
. 
4 Douglas, M Cultural Bias Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper no 
35, London 1978. 
5 Douglas, M (ed) Essays in the Sociology of Perception Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1982 
6 Douglas, M & Wildavsky, A Risk and Culture University of California Press, 
1982 
7 Mars, G Cheats at Work Allen & Unwin, 1982 
8 Gross, J L & Rayner, S Measuring Culture Columbia University Press, 1985 
The model proposes that an individual’s behaviour, perception, attitudes and values 
are shaped, regulated and controlled by constraints that can be grouped into two 
domains labelled as: grouD commitment and grid control. 
Combined, these provide four prototypes: four possible scenarios of social life. 
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Group, the horizontal coordinate, represents the extent to which people are restricted 
in thought and action by their commitment to a social unit larger than the individual. 
High group strength results when people devote a lot of their available time to 
interacting with other members of their unit. In general, the more things they do 
together, and the longer they spend doing them, the higher the group strength. 
Mars” proposes four tests for group strength: the freauency of interpersonal 
interactions, linked to mutualitv of interactions, the m of these interactions and 
the boundarv tightness (inclusion/exclusion). The more positively one can ascertain 
these elements - the stronger the group dimension. 
Group strength is low when people negotiate their way through life on their own 
behalf as individuals, neither constrained by, nor reliant upon, a single group of 
others. 
Grid, the vertical coordinate, is the complementary bundle of constraints on social 
interaction, a composite index of the extent to which people’s behaviour is 
constrained by role differentiation, whether within or without membership of a 
group. Grid is high strength whenever roles are distributed on the basis of explicit 
public social classifications, such as sex, colour, position in a hierarchy, holding a 
9 The following description of the constituents of G/G is taken, with few 
additions and omissions from Gross & Rayner, 1985 (op tit) pp 5-l 1 
10 Mars, 1982 (op tit) 
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bureaucratic office, descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point of progression 
through an age-grade system. It is low strength when classificatory distinctions only 
weakly limit the range of social choices or activities open to people. 
A low-grid social environment is one in which access to roles depends upon personal 
abilities to compete or negotiate for them, or even of formal regulations for taking 
equal turns. In either case, where access to roles is not dependent on any ascribed 
characteristics of rank or birth, we would recognize a low-grid condition. 
Weak Grid/Weak Group 
Quadrant A (weak grid/weak group) allows the maximum options for negotiating 
contracts or choosing allies. Consequently, it also allows for individual mobility up 
and down the scale of prestige and influence. No one cares about the past or about 
anyone’s ancestry. Each person is responsible for himself and for whomsoever else 
he chooses, not for the weak or the needy, unless he wills it so. 
Strew Grid/Weak Group 
Quadrant B (strong grid/weak group) is an environment in which the way persons 
may behave is strongly regulated according to their socially assigned classifications. 
It is often a hierarchical environment in which most persons are classified out of the 
decision-making process. Perhaps the classifying criterion is ancestry, and all roles 
are based on its correlatives. Or maybe the criterion age, so that each person passes 
through a stream of age-related categories. Unlike quadrant A, the control exerted 
in this environment is not that of one person forcing his will upon another, but 
rather that of a whole society ready to negotiate only those deals that reinforce the 
pervasive social classifications. 
Strong Grid/Stronv Group 
Quadrant C (strong grid/strong group) is where one might find tradition-bound 
institutions in which everyone knows his place, but in which that place might vary 
with time. Extensive security is obtained at the expense of most possibilities for 
overt competition and social mobility. Examples of this type of social organisation 
include bureaucracies that base their roles on seniority (an ascribed basis) rather than 
merit (an achieved basis), or a cohesive tribal society with hereditary roles. Such a 
bureaucratic environment might occur in civil service, an educational system, a 
strongly unionized industry, where promotion is based on length of service rather 
than competitively upon relative ability. 
An individual in quadrant C who goes along with the system may expect eventual 
rewards, unless collective misfortune intervenes. In bad times, everyone sinks 
together. The king might be the first to die in battle, and the captain will go down 
with his ship. This is very much unlike weak grid/weak group quadrant A, in which 
a king (who is likely to have been a usurper) might have a refuge for himself and his 
family prepared in advance, and in which a captain would sail off with provisions in 
the best lifeboat. In quadrant A, some individuals might be privately negotiating 
with the enemy and others too busy fighting each other for power to notice the 
collective threat. 
Weak Grid/Strong Group 
Finally, quadrant D (weak grid/strong group) is a social context in which the external 
group boundary is typically the dominant consideration. All other aspects of 
interpersonal relationships are ambiguous and open to negotiation. Leadership tends 
to be charismatic and lacking clear rules for succession. The suspicion of infiltration 
by outsiders or betrayal by group members is rampant here. 
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3 Grid/Grouu Analvsis of the Armed Forces 
3.1 The Armed Forces 
Douglas does not clearly specify where do you start your analysis: is it on the 
individual level or the institutional one. 
According to the model one can project either. That is: to draw expectations of 
individual behaviour based on institutional configurations; and to analyse individual 
behaviour, which in turn should throw a relief of the main institutional features. 
I will start with a view from above and will try to answer the following 
question: on the combined dimensions of Grid and Group, where will the main 
Forces fit, assessing them along these criteria: 
- how much is the core mission group dependent? aad what intensity of 
face to face interaction does it require (Group dimensions) 
- how much is the elementary fighting unit technology driven? (Grid 
dimension) 
- how much is the detailed execution of the fighting mission command 
controlled? (Grid dimension) 
To begin with, the main feature of the armed forces, anv armed forces, is its 
emphasis on structure, hierarchy and discipline. In this sense it is strong Grid. Since 
most of its work is clearly interdependent, that is group bounded, therefore Quadrant 
C is the most appropriate to place the Armed Forces in. However, when considering 
the different Forces, some differentiation begins to show. 
3.1.1 The Navy is still well placed in Quadrant C. Its core mission is very much 
group dependent there can hardly be a tighter boundary than around a vessel at sea; 
interpersonal interactions .are condensed in space, frequent and over a long span of 
time (Strong Group). 
It is highly structured in terms of role specificity, expertise (professionalism) and 
areas of responsibility (Strong Grid). Its operation is clearly technology driven: 
without its ‘technical senses’ (Sonar, Radar, Radio) the vessel is at a loss (Strong 
Grid). 
Both Grid elements result in a highly regulated form of “the way you do things”. It 
was a direct result of this regulated behaviour patterns that the Israeli Navy suffered 
its heaviest loss in its history when the destroyer Yaffo was sunk in 1968 from a 
direct Egyptian missile hit. This was made possible since the vessel used a rigid 
patrol route and its captain prided himself of timing his rounds on the split of a 
minute. 
It was not until it started to operate the smaller vessels - the missile boats - that the 
Navy has become a significant factor in the IDF war strategy, particularly since its 
success in the Yom Kippur War. 
Missile boats are still high on both dimensions: Grid and Group, but its smaller size 
allows a somewhat less rigid form of operation and calls for local enterprise and 
initiative. It thus fits better into the corporate culture of the IDF, which although 
firmly rooted in quadrant ‘c’ (Strong Grid - Strong Group), has historically always 
leaned towards ‘D’ (Weak Grid - Strong Group). 
Strong Grid 
Strong Group 
B C 
Navy 
A D 
3.1.2 The Air Force, although seemingly clearly placed in the same quadrant C 
(technology dependent, central command is capable of direct controlling of any 
operational aircraft; strong group identity: Air Force clearly differentiates itself from 
other Forces) reveals under closer scrutiny, a more complicated relief, . 
The Air Force comprises of two parts: the airborne operation and the grounded, 
technological back-up. Furthermore, the elementary fighting unit is the single 
aircraft, which can and does operate as a separate entity (even though it would 
normally be part of a formation). 
This individualistic constituent - the pilot - who is at the critical edge of a highly 
complex group and technological effort (the aircraft), complicates things. 
While as a Force, the Air Force would be placed in Quadrant C, the pilot, and in 
particular a fighter ace, would need to be free of constraints of traditions, regulations 
and norms (Weak Grid) as well as of the impositions of group standards and 
pressures (Weak Group). When manoeuvring his way to the target, it is up to him 
and him alone, to interpret the situation and act to the best of his ability. 
Innovation, enterprise, risk taking, competition and thriving for excellence are the 
hallmarks of the successful fighter pilot who is the creme de la crCme, the role model 
of the Israeli Air Force. His is the obvious case where only merit counts and status 
is a matter of personal achievement. In other words, a classical definition for an 
occupant of quadrant A. 
While entrepreneurial individualism is rewarded, Air Force pilots are also members 
of an exclusive club. “Hatovim-La’tayiss”: “the best (in plural) - for aviation”, is the 
wording of an advertisement, successfully employed by Air Force recruiters for the 
past three decades. A compulsory minimum of five years service, a prolonged 
probation period and compulsory living on the base compound (bachelors and 
families alike), encourage the creation of a strong group, which is marked by a 
surprising lack of emphasis on differentiation along lines of rank or seniority. Entry 
is difficult enough to make the selected few become full members of an egalitarian 
elite. When on the ground then, pilots are in quadrant D, typical to small scale 
egalitarian societies, where the Group dimension is strong and the Grid dimensions is 
weak. 
Similar is the case with Air Force technical support staff. A professional force, it is 
based on specialised, long-term service teams, emphasising technical know-how. 
The long working hours in small interdependent teams, the living in shared quarters 
and the identical professional training, help to create and maintain a strong external 
boundary, while de-emphasising in-group differences of rank, seniority or any 
personal peculiarities (ethnic origin, for instance, is a major source of differentiation 
in Israeli society). Like pilots, ground support staff form their own exclusive clubs. 
They would also be best characterised by behaviours, expectations and values typical 
to people in quadrant D (Strong Group, Weak Grid). 
The composite positioning of the Air Force is therefore as follows: 
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This composite relief highlights the problematics of the concept of Organisational 
Culture. Which one is true? Surely all of them. Here we have the wrporate culture 
(C) which is however dramatically different from the Qperational culture (A) and 
both are still dissimilar to the working culture (D). 
This outline also highlights the potential in-built conflicts within the system, some of 
which will be discussed under a separate heading (Section 4). 
3.1.3 The Army is even more complex to place than the Air Force. The Army as 
a centralised form of command is a fairly recent development in the IDF. It 
followed years of heated debates, the General Staff putting arguments for and 
against. Historically there was a separation between the two main Forces: Infantry 
and the Armoured Corps, each developing their identities, and each under direct (and 
separate) command of the Chief of Staff. 
“Milhamot Ha’generalim” (the wars of the generals) as these have been coined since 
1973 (when the failures in the Yom Kippur War triggered public accusations and 
counter-accusations by senior army officers) are echoed among the rank and file. In 
a series of well know incidents, in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, 
infantry teams were transferred en masse to the Armoured Corps, to fill the 
immediate gaps in manpower. The transplants proved disastrous both to the 
transferees as well as to the absorbing regiments. 
cultural clash. 
G/G illuminates this (unavoidable) 
The small group is central to the formation of Infantry, since it is the platoon 
(Mahlaka) and the company (Pluga) that make the elementary fighting unit. While 
the battalion (Gdud), which is still small enough to allow close relations among its 
members (Strong Group) would be credited with major operational responsibility. 
Since technology is only secondary to man and operational command is localised 
(Weak Grid), this combination of Strong Group and Weak Grid (quadrant D) drives a 
strong localised (regimental) identity. 
When in operational service, the Infantry is firmly in quadrant ‘D’. 
The successful infantry units are renown for their ispirit d’corps, a manifestation of 
a tight boundary, separating insiders from the outside world. Loyalty to peers and 
the group is legendary among the par troopers, the elite infantry brigade. A major 
motivator to continue and volunteer lal 
lads”. 
for reserve service is “not to let down the 
Golani, now a renown infantry regiment, was referred to twenty years ago under the 
derogatory term “the Mau-Mau riff-raft”. 
poor standards. 
It had a reputation of unreliability and 
insight. 
Whoever took the decision to change this image had the right 
By painstakingly introducing “new blood” into the system, a new identity 
was encouraged. 
type cultures. 
It is a slow process but the only one that works with quadrant ‘D 
the system. 
Enforcement from above, would have resulted with resistance from 
A ‘D’ type culture resists imposed change and has the means (informal 
leadership) and framework (local identity) to do so. 
Possibly the same principle was in mind when more recently a new infantry brigade 
- Givati - was created. It was renamed after the renown brigade from the War of 
Independence, as a way to instil a recognition of excellence and of continuity. 
Tradition is of importance in a Strong Group culture. 
From a central command perspective, the handicap of a Strong Group - Weak Grid 
framework (quadrant D) is its tendency to create autonomy. 
bureaucrat’s nightmare, 
Fifedoms are the 
firstly, because they incline to challenge regulations and 
procedures; secondly, because effective hands-on control from central command is 
made impossible. The IDF found it to its cost both in Beirut in 1983 and presently, 
in the Intifada (uprising) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is platoon 
commanders, not the Chief of Staff who really decide the do’s and don’ts of the daily 
engagements with the hostile population. 
“who you are” but “are you one of us”. 
To quadrant ‘D’ people, what counts is not 
And the longer the operational field period 
(as opposed to the training, base-bound period) the ‘D’ culture becomes stronger. 
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11 One volunteers to the paratroopers and has to voluntarily reaffirm his 
commitment as a reservist. 
Which is partly why in peace times the infantry units alternate between operational 
periods (border patrol) and training periods, to instil a higher degree of Grid 
(discipline, rank) and bring the infantry closer to the army’s core culture (Y7)12. 
The Armoured Corps, in contrast, and in particular the Artillery Corps, are literally 
worlds apart. For them, technology has an overriding importance. The tank has a 
team at its core, but it is the functional roles that are emphasised not their social 
correlates. Close team spirit is to an extent even discouraged because of the tactical 
necessity during battle, to compose teams (by function) according to availability. 
Furthermore, the doctrine dictates that the solitary tank is not the basic fighting unit, 
but rather the Pluga (squadron) comprising of 3-4 tanks (although of course each of 
them is fully self-sufficient). 
While Group is discounted, Grid is emphasised. Compartmentalisation and insulation 
are at the core of the tank design. The men are physically bounded to their niches, 
each performing just one task and they do not communicate face to face, but 
through signals (the tank commander steers the vehicle by tapping on the driver’s 
head and shoulders) and via the internal communication system. 
The Armoured Corps have by far the strictest discipline, among the major Forces. 
Regulations, procedures and standards are keenly observed and the tanks annual 
inspection parades lean heavily towards perfection of appearance and cleanliness (of 
the tanks, that is). 
The Artillery has similarly a Strong Grid - Weak Group culture. Its dependency on 
technology is probably greater than is the case with the Armoured Corps. The 
operation of a modern artillery battery requires a highly specified technological 
know-how. Timing, punctuality, strict adherence to regulations and orders is 
paramount for its successful operation. Similar to the tank, a gun’s design is heavily 
restrictive to its operators. 
As an operational unit the Artillery (unlike the Armoured Corps) is a service 
function par excellence. That is, it is entirely Bxternally commanded. In fact, its 
head is not even integral to its formation. Rather, he acts as counsel to the 
Regimental (Divisional) command. 
The batteries are dispersed among ‘Core Forces’, like the Infantry or the Armoured 
Corps, responding to requests (or rather demands) for assistance. 
Its technology and core mission confine the battery to the periphery of the battle 
field. The long fire range imposes the frustrating set-up for its operators, rarely to 
know who is it they are firing at and rarely been given immediate feedback of 
results. They move, form and fire when ordered and their supplies are centrally 
provided. In short, they are never pro-active. 
The emphasised dependency, the structural fragmentation and the institutionalised 
lack of initiative interfere with the creation of a Strong Group. There is no way in 
which a regimental identity as in the Infantry can develop. Identity would tend to 
be xenophobic (that is, externally and negatively defined) rather than internally and 
positively stated, as say, with the Infantry. , 
12 During the long involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980’s, the international 
border between Lebanon and Israel was also known among infantry men as the 
“marshal1 law line”. Re-entering Israel, soldiers would smarten their appearance 
and reduce travel speed to comply with army regulations. 
4 Grid/GrouD Analysis of the individual in the Armed Fotceq 
The scope of this presentation is too limited to allow a comprehensive discussion on 
the place of the individual in the Armed Forces. I would like therefore to focus on 
two key aspects, both interlinked: organisational rivalry and deviance. 
4.1 Owanisational Rivalrv 
G/G is conducive to highlighting differences in values, perceptions and preferences, 
as a result of an organisation’s positioning along the dimensions of Grid and Group. 
The intense indoctrination a new recruit goes through, facilitates his transformation 
into an “organisation man” and one’s commitment is further sustained by powerful 
organisational symbols such as a specified uniform. 
Disagreements between Forces on an organisational level via its representatives, the 
individual soldiers, is only to be expected. 
The difficulty in transforming an Infantry man into an Armoured Corps man has 
been discussed. Another traditional rivalry is between the Military Police and, in 
particular, the paratroopers, a rivalry that can escalate from individual conflict o 
Regimental Staff confrontation, necessitating interventions from the Chief of Staff 15 . 
The reasons for this clash are apparent, when considering that both groups are 
positioned at the very extreme opposites of the cultural map. 
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The paratroopers, (Strong Group - Weak Grid) as an elite force of the Infantry, are 
bounded by a Strong Group boundary, emphasising in-group egalitarianism (“we are 
all the same”) which will manifest itself as solidarity in out-group contacts. Their 
organisational culture encourages the development of initiative, personal 
responsibility and improvisation and to adversely respond to (external) authority, 
regulations and order. Paratroopers thrive in ambiguity and the chaos of the 
battlefield. Part of their shared ethos is a sloppy appearance. This goes against the 
grain of the Military Police. They are the personification of order, discipline and 
13 Milshtein, U Milhamot Ha’tsanhanim 1971 
law enforcement. Theirs is the power of authority. Their role is entirely functional 
and wether it is executed in solo or in teams is of no consequence to their mission. 
If they have a group identity it is often a reaction from the world outside. No one 
likes the people who do the dirty work. 
The Military Police are very strong on Grid and weak on Group. Their culture 
emphasis dependency, discipline, orderlines, clear cut distinction between “right” and 
“wrong”. As the only mediating factor between the two is power - formal coercion 
(Military Police) against group cohesion (Paratroopers) - violent clashes are the means 
of communication. 
4.2 Interuersonal and Institutional Deviance 
In a system of which power is a critical constituent and which uses conscription as 
the main method of recruitment, deviance plays an important role. 
An individual who does not fit into the Force, has little chance of escape. There are 
established terms of exit, but most bear a high cost for the individual - some 
unpopular Forces (eg. the Military Police) practically put a bar on voluntary exit. 
Disengagement is therefore often limited to crises, which would imply either breach 
of rules followed by a court marshal1 (typically followed by imprisonment and 
possible transfer); or an attempt of discharge from Military Service altogether, via 
the medical route (typically on the grounds of mental health unsuitability). Yet a 
third possibility is to rebel against the system, which is sometimes a not entirely 
conscious attempt to seek attention and solicit help (sort of a Levinian avoidance - 
avoidance trap). 
It is by investigating such deviant occurrences that one can shed light on important 
aspects of the system and G/G offer some useful insights on what shape these may 
take. 
It is hypothesised that deviance will manifest itself as aggression against what is 
perceived to be the key to an individual misery, as follows: 
Weak Group 
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Where Strong Group - 
the group. As Douglas’ v 
eak Grid prevails, the individual is likely to rebel against 
suggests, an egalitarian group has limited sanctions against 
its deviating members. Its means are informal (moral pressure, social control, 
informal boycott) and the only real sanction is ultimate expulsion. 
14 Douglas, M 1978 (op tit) 
11 
Discontent will therefore express itself by (personal) poor performance which 
necessarily will impact on the group as a whole (indirect rebellion); or by informing 
on the group to a higher authority (direct rebellion) as did a newly arrived to a small 
infantry unit who felt rejected by the established group. 
However, sometimes Group pressure may lead to inability to react against the group, 
particularly if one identifies with the group or with the norm of group solidarity. In 
frustration, aggression will be turned against one’s self. Cases of self-inflicted injury 
and suicide are not uncommon in the elite Infantry units. 
Where Strong Group - Strong Grid prevail, individuals will react against the group 
and/or the organisation. Deviants will be more easily found among those who do not 
have an immediate strong support group, such as the case of a cook in the Navy who 
felt alienated from the group (as the only cook on the vessel) and got himself 
discharged due to ‘incompetence’: his cooking put the personnel at risk. His mate 
from the same vessel was less lucky. He rebelled against the system and was jailed 
for several years for jeopardising an operation. He raised a false alarm over alleged 
malfunction and the vessel was forced to return to base. 
Deviance in a Weak Group - Strong Grid environment is a particularly sad affair. It 
would be directed either against the repressive authority or-and against the not less 
repressive machinery, which although operated by the person, actually ‘operates* him. 
The common case is of “Sseruv Pkuda” (refusal to carry out a command). This is a 
no-win situation, and all the individual gains is to register his (ineffective) protest 
against authority and thereby asserting his individuality in a system that aims to 
discard individualism. 
In the Artillary Corps, an artillary battery during the Lebanon War discharged itself 
by wrongly operating the equipment. Both equipment and men were inflicted: the 
system was damaged, the men were injured. 
In a well publicised case in the early 19803, a number of Armoured Corps technical 
staff were found guilty of damaging the engines of tanks (instead of repairing them). 
the rebelled against the system by reacting against the machines that were controlling 
their lives. 
Finally, in the case of a Weak Group - Weak Grid culture, there is no one to rebel 
against. Aggression is therefore self-directed. However, since quadrant ‘A’ is rather 
atypical to the Armed Forces it is rather uncommon. Although, in quite a few fatal 
accidents there were rumours that they may have of pilots in the Air Force been 
self-inflicted. 
5 Flnal FJott 
The case of the Israeli Defence Forces was put forward as a model for analysing 
organisational culture in the Armed Forces. 
The IDF shares a great deal in common with all other Armed Forces, but it is of 
course a specific case. The IDF is set within a given society (which impacts its 
values) in a particular geopolitical situation and it is a conscript army, to mention 
some of the main features. 
Grid/Group Analysis, as a universalistic cultural model,, may be a suitable 
framework for a comparative study of the Armed Forces in different societies and in 
different historical periods. 
